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Belov S.I. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES "ARMIES CRAIOVA" IN AN INITIAL STAGE OF LIBERATION OF POLAND (JULY — DECEMBER, 1944)Within the framework of the present study raises the problem of how justified were tough actions of the Soviet leadership with regard to "Home Army" during the liberation of Poland from German occupation. Particular attention is paid to the question of how systematic, planned and politically subversive actions were justified saboteurs AK. The focus of the author is also the question of the extent of damage caused by the Soviet troops and the Interim Government of the Polish nationalists terrorist attacks. The decision of the designated range of problems has been made possible through the conversion to unpublished and already entered into scientific circulation sources, including the documents of the Red Army, and interior materials AK. Accumulated at the stage of source material heuristics was systematized and analyzed through the application of scientific and special methods, including multi-disciplinary practices and approaches. The main conclusion of the study amounts to the recognition that Moscow tough stance against the AK units wore a reasoned nature. Guide nationalists was not originally planned to cooperate with the Soviet side, considering the USSR as its enemy. Position AK and affiliated structures was conditioned with her territorial ambitions, anti-Soviet and russophobia typical of pre-war Polish elite, whose members dominated among nationalists. Already in the initial period of the liberation of Poland AK launched a large-scale subversive activities against the Soviet troops and the government formed by the Lublin government. Results militancy AK Steel emergence of the USSR significant difficulties in the fight against Germany, the beginning of the civil war in Poland in the post-war period, growth of the probability of starting a new "big war" in Europe after the defeat of the Nazi empire, as well as the strengthening of the anti-Russian tradition in Polish culture.Key words: Home Army, the Soviet Union, Poland, subversion, and the politicization of the falsification of history.
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About this article
Author: Belov S.I.
Year: 2015
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Editor-in-chief |
Sergey Aleksandrovich MIROSHNIKOV |
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